

ETHNOPOLITICAL
WARFARE

Causes,
Consequences,
and Possible
Solutions

Edited by

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First, we dedicate this book to our many friends and relatives who,
in the past century, have suffered so unjustly from
ethno-political warfare.

The editors of this book are long-time friends who graduated
together in 1960 from the Albany Academy. So, our second
dedication is to two of our masters from the academy:

To Frank Nash, who taught us to love the written word,
and to David Midgley, who gave us our first glimpse
of the study of politics.

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gynist countries where the primary and dominant identity (philosophical, biological, political, economic, and psychologically) is the individual, ethnic, or national. Far from being simply a dangerous travesty, it is a positive—yes, positive—element.

The Enlightenment dream of a universal civil/civil society is not only utopian; it is a negative one. We must recognize ethnic identification as a *living barrier* that in its ambivalent, hybrid manner, actually contributes to our individualism by adding an invaluable dimension to it—a dimension that is not simply socially effective, but socially affective. Without ethnicity's social affect, the effect of a one-dimensional Lockean individualism may create (some say it already has) a "stranger egoism"—Max Stirner's (1971) "stranger egoism" populated by narcissistic selves.

Our goal should be to construct societies where the option of ethnic identification prevails over the imperative of ethnic identity (Jowitz, 1998b), not to eliminate ethnicity *per se*. We should oppose social definitions and organizations that diminish the individual's ability to relativize his and her ethnic identification. We should favor social definitions and organizations where ethnic identification makes partial, contingent, and relative claims that shrink those of a potentially greedy state, and stretch those of a potentially stingy individualism.

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3

NATIONALISM AND ETHNICITY: RESEARCH AGENDAS ON THEORIES OF THEIR SOURCES AND THEIR REGULATION

BRENDAN O'LEARY

As a political scientist writing for psychologists I have decided not to summarize what political scientists and political sociologists claim to know about nationalism and ethnicity. Instead, I will rapidly, and with maximum feasible insensitivity, address two topics: (a) how political sociologists and political scientists explain nationalism, or, alternatively, what they consider worthy of explanatory attention, and (b) how political sociologists, political scientists, and political philosophers explain (and justify) the regulation of national and ethnic differences.

EXPLAINING NATIONALISM IN POLITICAL SCIENCE AND POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY

Debate among political scientists and sociologists about how best to understand nationalism can be classified in four ways. The first two ways can be presented in a cross-tabulation on the basis of the answers given to two questions, presented in Table 3.1. They are answers to the two following issues:

I would like to thank participants at the Undergraduate Symposium (conference at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton University, December 1997, for comments on a previous version of this presentation, especially Ian Lustick, David Thelen, and Alex Mee. I would also like to thank John McGinn.

TABLE 3.1
The Place of Nationalism in World-Time

| Base of nationalism's appeal | Modernity (industrial) | Postindustrial (industrial and agraria) | Primitivist (industrial, agraria, and forager) |
|------------------------------|---|---|--|
| Ideas | Kedourie | Hastings, 1997 | Popper, 1945 van den Berghe, 1990 |
| Interests | V. RC (e.g., Banton, Goodin, Hechter), V. M. (e.g., Hobsbawm, Mandel) | | |
| Identities | Walzer | Armstrong | Isaacs, 1975 |
| Ideas and interests | Gellner, Non-V, RC (Latin), Non-V, M. (Anderson, 1983, 1991) | Rousseau | |
| Interests and identities | Greenfield, 1992 | Smith (A. D.) 1966, 1994 Horowitz, 1985, 1989a & b | Herder |
| Ideas and identities | Cornor, 1994 | | |

Note: V = vulgar; RC = national choice; Non-V = non-vulgar; M = Marxist.

1. The Place of Nationalism in World-Time

This issue differentiates among the following:

- **Modernists**, who maintain that nationalism is a destructively modern (industrial, capitalist, post-Reformation) phenomenon, perhaps anticipated in a few pre-modern (agrarian, pre-capitalist, pre-Reformation) politics but never fully realized therein.
- **Ethno-communitists**, who maintain that nations (or most nations) are built on ethnic cores, or *ethnie*, and insist that such ethnic cores were widespread and persistent in pre-modern politics and social systems, although not all of them. Although they may accept that it may not be true that for every nation, *n*, in modernity, there corresponds an historically previous ethnic, *e*, in pre-modernity, they nevertheless think that an authentic ethnic past mightily assists nation-building, and that the absence of an authentic ethnic past significantly assists nation-building failures.
- **Primitivists**, who maintain that nations and nationalism are expressions of persistent and permanent (genetic or natural)

features of humans as collectivities. Nations are, so to speak, expressions of ethnic nepotism, or large-scale contemporary expressions of the urge to live with one's kin. Hard-line primitivism emphasizes the genetic roots of ethnonational sentiment; soft-line primitivism emphasizes the derivability of collective ethnic identities acquired in childhood.

2. The Basis of the Appeal of Nationalism

This issue differentiates among the following:

- **Idealists**, who explain the salience and impact of ideas by their persuasive, discursive, cognitive, and emotional traits (I include postmodernists within this category, their philosophical range notwithstanding).
- **Instrumentalists**, who explain the appeal of ideas by the interests that they serve.
- **Identificationalists**, who explain the appeal of ideas by their roles in identity formation, affirmation, and expression.

This differentiation of the sources of the appeal of nationalism is not mutually exclusive. It is possible to believe in the importance of both ideas and interests; to believe in the importance of both interests and identities; to believe in the importance of ideas and identities; and last, to accommodate all three explanatory sources of the appeal of nationalism (ideas, interests, and identities). The answers given to the questions of the placement of nationalism in world-time and the bases of its appeal can be summarized in the cells of Table 3.1, which indicate the approaches of some of the major thinkers on the subjects.

Debates over the placement of nationalism in world-time are partly structured by disagreement over terms (e.g., over the meaning of nations, ethnic groups, etc.) and partly by normative fears and beliefs. For example, (a) the fear of tribalism makes many treat nationalism as a permanent threat to liberalism (Popper, 1945), and (b) the desire to transcend nationalism makes many emphasize the contingency of nationalism (Hobsbawm, 1992). Some of this debate, however, is open, in principle, to historical and empirical research, for example, the dependence or otherwise of actually existing nations on previously existing ethnic, the subject that Ernest Gellner (1964) marvelously captured in his question, "Do nations have navels?"

Debates over the bases of the appeal of nationalism are partly methodological; for example, rational choice theorists maintain that we should test the limits of rational and narrowly instrumentalist explanations. They are also partly normative. For example, *nationophiles* prefer to emphasize the salience of identity, whereas *nationophobes* prefer to emphasize the role of

interests, nationophobes also tend to emphasize what they see as the cognitively challenged nature of nationalists.

This brief summary, and its tabular representation, surveys the standard range of variation in explanatory accounts of nationalism in political science, political sociology and, I would add, in history—or at least those sections of that profession that do not think truth lies somewhere in an as yet undiscovered archive. Two other and related big questions structure debate among political scientists and sociologists.

3. Is the Salience of Nationalism Variable Across Elites and Masses?

This question is perhaps the tacit theme in analysis of the political history of nationalism. There are at least three stylized answers in the literature and a related difference on the sources of nationalist extremism.

- The first answer, perhaps best represented by Paul Brass's (1990) work on India, suggests that elites use and abuse the identities and ideas of the masses because of the interests of elites; Brass's work is sophisticated but, his critics maintain, fails satisfactorily to explain why elites choose ethnic identities for mobilization rather than other identities.
- The second answer suggests that elites both construct and then use and abuse the national identities and ideas of the masses—whose identities and ideas are therefore plainly inauthentic. (Although the expression “false consciousness” is rarely heard these days, it is plainly signaled.) This pattern of thought is the one that liberal and leftist teachers manage to impart to their weaker students, even if that is not their intention. It is difficult to convert real academics of this pattern of thought but, if pressed, I would maintain that this perspective is the burden of John Breuilly's (1982) *Nationalism and the State* and of Eric Hobsbawm's (1990) recent work—although the latter, through dependence on Ernest Gellner (1983), does seek to explain why ethnonational identities might have appeared rooted in the experiences of what he scornfully called the “lesser examination passing” classes.
- The third answer, and the one I am most comfortable with, sees elites, as much as the masses, as constrained by their ethnonational identities, although these identities themselves may be capable of slow and occasionally sudden shifts. In different ways and with different methodologies, this perspective is held by Walter Durrer (1994), the most brilliant essayist on ethnonationalism; by Donald Horowitz (1985), the most comprehen-

sive and lucid comparative analyst of ethnic conflict; and by David Little, whose insightful “soft rational choice” perspective on the choices of language repertoires in Africa manages to respect the interests and intelligence of elites and masses.

- The fourth answer is more nuanced. It focuses on the sources of nationalist extremism—assuming that all are vulnerable, in principle, to the alleged “backlash.” Here there is an interesting disjunction. Conservatives, such as Eric Kedourie (1966, 1971), and Marxists such as Ernest Mandel, maintain that ethnonational extremism, especially its dehumanizing varieties, is the special vice of modern intellectuals, perhaps especially of certain kinds of petty bourgeois with status anxieties. By contrast, liberals and libertarians tend to see the masses, unschooled in a free society, sunk in closed tribalism, in pre-entlightenment, as the potential founts of genocide, ethnic expulsion, and worse. In this perspective, the reason of intellectuals is to play on these mass susceptibilities—although plainly they are not held to have created them.

4. Is (or When Is) Nationalism Strong, Moderate, or Weak?

The last big question concerns the strength of nationalism. It sets an important research agenda, vital to our times and our century. Questions addressed here include the following:

- Is nationalism strong in the sense that, in crisis conditions, it will trump all other ideas, or issues (e.g., liberalism, socialism, conservatism), especially if these are non-national? Intelligent people, who minimize their wishful thinking, know the answer to this question. Of course!
- Is nationalism strong intellectually or ideologically, in the sense of providing a repertoire of answers for the design of political institutions and the shaping of public policy; or is it, alternatively, always enmeshed with other intellectual and ideological traditions because it lacks a sufficient prescriptive core to survive on its own?
- Is nationalism strong in the sense that, in crisis conditions, its power is such that it trumps all other identities—conferring belief systems, such as religious, civic, administrative, and personal identities and all other interest-conferring roles?
- Is nationalism strong when nationalities are threatened or made insecure but are otherwise moderate or weak? Alternatively, is it the product of “the sleep of reason”—a monster that is either

- dominant or in control but incapable of being emasculated or eliminated?
- Is nationalism strong only in the transition to modernity but weaker thereafter?
- Is nationalism strong only when democratic (or democratic) but otherwise fragile?
- Is nationalism war-provoking, and is it more war-provoking than other idealisms or identity-affirming beliefs? Likewise, does nationalism provoke genocide and ethnic expulsions and other horrific phenomena?

This chapter cannot address all the subtleties and sub-subtleties raised in the four big questions. But I would claim, provisionally, that these four questions comprise the bulk of the explaining of nationalism that takes place in political science and political sociology. We should, perhaps, ask ourselves whether these are the only or the right questions that our disciplines should address.

My brutal review suggests the following: Our disciplines do correctly address the issue best formulated by Gellner (1964). And that is this simple query: Why is there nationalism in our times, and why was there no (or in the weaker theses, were little) nationalism in pre-modern times? If the question is correctly formulated the answer must be sought both in the constraints of human nature—best addressed by anthropologists and psychologists—and in the transformation of our economic and political systems by the bundle of elements we correctly call modernity. It is, of course, open to people to deny that the question is correctly formulated to maintain that *nationalism* is merely the word we give to a range of phenomena that have always been with us. I think they are wrong, but I am open to persuasion. If the question is correctly formulated, then the question becomes, does Gellner or anyone else have a convincing answer? My answer, candidly, is not yet. I am convinced, however, that the answer lies in accounting for the nationalization of states, a phenomenon that is related to the democratization, industrialization, and militarization of the world in the past two centuries.

THE REGULATION OF ETHNONATIONAL DIFFERENCES

There is, or so I would claim, an emergent field of inquiry within political science and political philosophy devoted to the regulation of ethnic and national differences for the want of a better term let us call its domain *national and ethnic conflict regulation*. From political science some of the major contributions to its development have come from Ted Gurr (1993), Milton Eisen (1973, 1987, 1994), Donald Horowitz (1989a), David Laitin, Arend Lijphart (1977a, 1977b), Jan Lustick (1979, 1993), and Erik Nordlinger

(1972), and from political philosophy some of the major contributions have come from Charles Taylor, Will Kymlicka, and Michael Walzer. Most of my own recent work with John McGarry (McGarry & O'Leary, 1995) is within this field.

How does this second field of work relate to the first field of work, the one asking the big questions about the nature of nationalism? The answer is not as direct as one might think. Explanations of nationalism in general do not necessarily determine analyses of its regulation, nor prescriptions for its regulation. That is not to say that there are no relationships. Modernists tend to have greater optimism about the management and transcendence of national and ethnic conflict than do ethnocentrists and primordialists. Those who emphasize the salience of ideas in explaining nationalism tend to emphasize the possibilities for conflict resolution created through alternative ideological mobilization or educational transcendence. Those who emphasize the salience of interests tend to explain ethnic relations through a realist focus on the balance of power between groups. Those who emphasize identities focus on the recognition and the misrecognition of collective identities.

Domestic Differences

McGarry and I maintain that there is a finite set of pro-domestic strategies (combinations of goals and instruments) available to states for the regulation of ethnonational differences, summarized in our ENJ(M)END taxonomy (in Table 3.2). They are structured by a grand strategic question, whether to eliminate differences or to manage them. The eight strategies are not mutually exclusive; different strategies can be applied to different groups and, indeed, different strategies can be applied to different people within the same groups. The strategies are available to modern states but may be applied to pre-modern peoples within their jurisdictions. The research agenda that flows from this taxonomy has three components:

- *Empirical and explanatory*—to seek to specify when and why states adopt each strategy and the limits to the realization of each strategy; for example, an argument which purports to demonstrate that stable majoritarian federations require a *strong Volk*, a dominant people.
- *Empirical and ethical*—to seek to specify the ethical and political arguments used to justify each strategy (which may, one day, help in early warning monitoring).
- *Narrative and practical*—to specify which strategies are compatible with reasonable liberal democratic norms and the circumstances in which they are likely to be successful (which may, one day, assist feasible constitutional engineering).

TABLE 3.2
Domestic Strategies for the Regulation of Ethnonational Differences

| End—eliminate ethnonational differences | Mend—manage ethnonational differences |
|--|---|
| 1. Genocide Eliminate people Goal: ethnic purity | 1. Control Manage people Goal: ethnic hierarchy; organize the dominant disorganize the dominated |
| 2. Integration ↔ Assimilation Eliminate relevance of ethnic differences Goal: eliminate differences from public life ↔ national homogenization | 2. Cosocialization Manage people while preserving differences Goal: ethnic equality and pluralism for the consociated (future integration not excluded) |
| 3. Ethnic expulsion Eliminate people from territories Goal: ethnic purity | 3. Arbitration Manage people impartially Goal: manage differences to promote accommodation or later integration |
| 4. Territorial elimination Eliminate people and territory through downsizing or resizing Goal: greater ethnonational homogenization | 4. Territorial management Manage people and territories Goal: ethnic federalism or autonomy, equality and diversity for stakeholders |

External Differences

In contrast to eight domestic strategies (some of which admittedly have major external ramifications), I have identified a set of five external orientations for rulers confronted by ethnic and national conflicts which have inter-state, or inter-imperial, or inter-imperial and inter-state implications (see Table 3.3).

The research agenda implicit in this taxonomy is similar to the one suggested by Table 3.2:

- Empirical and explanatory—to specify the development of each of these orientations, to account for their rise, and in some cases, fall, and to specify their limitations.
- Empirical and ethical—to specify what rulers, agents, and intellectuals advocate each orientation and why.
- Normative and practical—to specify which orientations are compatible with reasonable liberal democratic norms and the circumstances in which they are likely to be successful (which may, one day, assist feasible constitutional engineering).

Political scientists share with politicians the capacity to reduce the amount of reliable knowledge in the world. So, we are obliged to be humble.

TABLE 3.3
External Strategies for the Regulation of Ethnonational Differences

| Strategic approach to external ethno-national questions | Norms | Goals |
|---|---|-------------------------------------|
| Imperialism | No recognition of equals; instrumental external orientations (balance of power) | World empire |
| Westphalian Statism | States are equals; no interference in others' domestic ethnonational affairs | Interstate world; confederalist |
| Westphalian Liberal Individualist Statism | States are equals; no interference in others' domestic ethnonational affairs except to protect fundamental individualist human rights | Confederalist liberal individualism |
| Westphalian Communitarian Statism | States are equals; no interference in others' domestic ethnonational affairs except to protect pluralism and legitimate group rights | Confederalist communitarianism |
| Cosmopolitanism | States and nations are undesirable; external interference in states is justified in defense of correct cosmopolitan values (be they liberal, socialist, or theological) | Correct cosmopolis |

Note: Bold rows are compatible with nationalism; italicization is uniquely compatible with national chauvinism or the neo-fascists.

Brutally simple as they may be, however, these tables do offer everyone interested in these matters a way of ordering their thoughts, even if they provide no answers.

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